

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO.

OCI NO. 0305/61

9 November 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Approved for Release by
Date 17 OCT 1989

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Soviet moves following the 22nd party congress have maintained the pattern the USSR has pursued since the Vienna talks last June, combining pressure and intimidation tactics with hints of flexibility in negotiations for a compromise settlement on Berlin. The TASS statement of 5 November which implied that the USSR will conduct further nuclear tests if the Western powers continue testing, particularly if the US undertakes atmospheric tests, strongly suggests that Khrushchev feels he must maintain the war of nerves to achieve his objectives in Berlin. At the same time, however, statements by Khrushchev and Ulbricht on Berlin and Germany reflect Moscow's desire to hold open the option of a negotiated settlement.

Nuclear Testing

In reaction to President Kennedy's 2 November statement on US testing plans, the 5 November TASS statement argued that the USSR might have to continue its tests if Western testing, particularly US testing in the atmosphere, placed the Soviet Union at a military disadvantage. The TASS statement was more cautious than the position Khrushchev is reported to have taken in talks with Italian Minister Codacci Pisanelli on 3 November: that the Soviet Union would continue its nuclear tests if the "United States" resumed "atmospheric" explosions.

Speaking with newsmen at a 7 November Kremlin reception, Khrushchev asserted that "we will stop nuclear tests when other powers stop." He was also quoted as saying "there will be more Soviet tests if the West goes on testing." He also appeared to deny that there would be another 50-megaton explosion. He parried a question as to whether the current test series is completed. Moscow did not report his impromptu remarks

with the newsmen, but TASS transmitted his formal toast. In the toast he acknowledged the dangers to human health from testing but said nuclear war would be more dangerous.

The TASS statements, quoting "leading circles in the USSR," charged the President's statement shows that the US is seeking an "illusory superiority in nuclear armament." Noting that the USSR has conducted fewer tests than the combined total of the US, Britain, and France, the TASS statement asserted that the Soviet Union has a "full moral right to equalize the situation and not to allow a discrepancy" between the number of Western and Soviet tests. It ignored the President's offer to conclude a test ban treaty with adequate inspections and controls, and repeated the standard Soviet proposal to sign immediately a treaty on general and total disarmament which would discontinue tests permanently.

In the UN debates on the six-power resolution calling for an end to testing, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin insisted that suspension of tests could not be divorced from the question of complete and general disarmament. After failing to defeat an amendment omitting a reference to complete and general disarmament, the Soviet bloc voted against the resolution. Tsarapkin also adopted an adamant stand against the US-UK resolution calling for renewed test ban negotiations. He relied heavily on the arguments in the TASS statement, claiming that the US was seeking to prevent further Soviet tests and gain a military preponderance through a test ban treaty.

Berlin and Germany

In impromptu remarks at a Kremlin reception on 7 November, Khrushchev said he was willing to be patient and wait for the West to take the initiative on

SECRET

negotiations on Berlin and Germany. He reiterated that the date was not important, but warned that the Soviet Government could not wait forever.

According to Western press reports, Khrushchev on 3 November told Pisanelli that the Soviet Union wanted a "proper settlement" of the Berlin dispute and therefore did not intend to act hastily. Khrushchev was said to have made the remark in explaining his statement to the congress that the USSR would not hold to its year-end deadline for a German peace treaty if the Western powers displayed readiness to negotiate. Khrushchev reportedly agreed with the Italian minister's assertion that "we must have negotiations and negotiations mean not only to receive concessions but to make concessions." Pisanelli said that Khrushchev expressed the view that negotiations were necessary and the only way out of what he described as the present "difficult international situation." There is no Soviet version of the conversation.

Speaking at the East Berlin airport on his 3 November return from Moscow, East German party chief Ulbricht put primary emphasis on a Berlin solution separate from a German peace treaty and endorsed further Soviet-US talks or four-power negotiations, without mentioning East or West German participation. He also supported a "phased reduction" of troops in Berlin and a settlement of access either through an agreement between the "interested parties" and East Germany or between "an independent and neutral" city of West Berlin and the East German regime. While Ulbricht reaffirmed that a peace treaty was necessary, he did not present this with a sense of urgency.

Pravda published an account of Ulbricht's speech, emphasizing his endorsement of US-Soviet discussions on Berlin, but omitting his statements relating a

peace treaty to resolution of the West Berlin problem.

The separation of a Berlin solution from the standard German peace treaty context was also reflected in the final resolution of the Soviet party congress, which dropped the usual language calling for a Berlin solution on the basis of a peace treaty and merely referred to the Soviet proposal to normalize the situation of West Berlin. According to the US Embassy in Rome, the pro-Communist newspaper Paese, in a 2 November article commenting on the conclusion of the congress, played up the omission of the idea of "solving the Berlin problem on the basis of a German peace treaty" and described it in a sub-headline as "an important concession to the West." The Italian Communists have frequently used Paese to float trial balloons for Soviet policy.

A TASS correspondent reportedly told a Western diplomatic observer on 1 November that now that the congress has been concluded, the USSR will come up with new policies both for the internal affairs of East Germany and on Berlin. According to the correspondent, the West can expect the USSR to propose new solutions to the Berlin problem in the near future.

During the last week the Soviets have set the stage for further encroachments against Allied travel with the objective of converting the East Berlin sector border to an international frontier. On 3 and 4 November, the East German police refused to accept from members of the Danish and Norwegian military missions in West Berlin accreditation documents issued by the Allied Control Commission. They have also refused to accept as sufficient the identification cards issued by the Allied military mission for civilian personnel, and have demanded passports instead. For several days the East German police also harassed US army vehicles making routine

SECRET

patrols in East Berlin. In addition, the USSR again protested Allied flights over East Berlin, asserting that this was East German territory.

Ambassador Thompson feels, on the basis of his conversations with Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, that eventually the East Germans will demand identification from military personnel. In this connection there are some indications that the checkpoint for Allied personnel will be shifted from Friedrichstrasse to an entrance point in the British sector. The USSR has indicated it will accept West Berlin police controls over Soviet military personnel entering West Berlin.

Finnish-Soviet Relations

The Finnish Government, in response to the Soviet note of 30 October proposing talks on defense measures, has announced that Foreign Minister Karjalainen, accompanied by three officials of the Foreign Ministry, will meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 11 November in Moscow for "exploratory" talks on the Soviet note. According to a Finnish Foreign Ministry spokesman, the meeting is not to be regarded as "consultation" under the terms of the 1948 treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. Karjalainen has not been authorized to negotiate but only to seek clarification.

The Finns apparently are trying to determine exactly what the USSR has in mind before opening formal talks. The Finns want to avoid any implication that they accept the Soviet contention that there is any threat posed by West Germany and its allies to the security of Finland or to the USSR via Finnish territory.

President Kekkonen, following his return from the United States on 3 November, sought in a radio and television broadcast

to reassure the Finnish public that the nation's independence and neutrality are not threatened by the Soviet move. He discounted the idea of an attack on the USSR through Finland, although he conceded that the outbreak of a general war could lead to violations of Finnish land, sea or air space.

Official public reaction in Scandinavia has been restrained.

The periodic meeting of the Nordic prime ministers in Finland on 11 and 12 November will provide these officials with an opportunity for a first-hand exchange of views.

Soviet propaganda following up the note seems designed to play down any suggestion of a crisis in Soviet-Finnish relations. The first indication to Soviet readers of any reaction appeared in a 3 November Izvestia article which carried an account of Kekkonen's statement in Los Angeles that the Soviet proposal for consultations is a legitimate request based on the Soviet-Finnish treaty. Pravda on the following day noted Kekkonen's return to Finland and reported a meeting of the Soviet-Finnish Society in Helsinki at which the Soviet ambassador delivered a message of greetings from Khrushchev. Moscow also publicized a lengthy summary of Kekkonen's 5 November speech. Soviet broadcasts have commented extensively on the situation but with primary emphasis on the threat of German influence in Northern Europe.

~~SECRET~~